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THE OVERLOOKED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IN PROTECTING
THE WESTERN ENVIRONMENT: NEPA IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
Michael C. Blumm* & Keith Mosman**
Abstract: Critics widely disparage the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) for being a mere “paper tiger” or bureaucratic red-tape. The U.S.
Supreme Court has surely encouraged this perception by treating the statute
with consistent hostility, reducing it to a requirement only to follow prescribed
administrative procedures but not produce any environmental results. But in the
Ninth Circuit, NEPA lives a more important life, since that court has not
forgotten NEPA’s essential environmental purpose. This article examines four
lines of cases in the Ninth Circuit that may show that NEPA’s future might
reflect its conservation purpose. These cases 1) deny NEPA plaintiffs with purely
economic motives standing, 2) exempt from NEPA analysis designations of
critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act because they have no physical
effect on the environment, 3) reduce the threshold for when NEPA requires
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) by requiring
environmental plaintiffs to raise only “substantial questions” about whether the
agency proposal may produce significant environmental effects, and 4) accept a
relaxed scope of alternatives in EISs on agency proposals that have a
conservation purpose. We maintain that if other circuits adopted these four
Ninth Circuit rules, NEPA would achieve the environmental protection that
Congress envisioned from the statute four decades ago.
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INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 1 the socalled Magna Carta of the environment, 2 suffers from a

1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).
2. J. Matthew Haws, Note, Analysis Paralysis: Rethinking the Court’s Role in
Evaluating EIS Reasonable Alternatives, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 537, 540 (2012) (“Since
President Richard Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970, the Act has been
described as the ‘Magna Carta’ of environmental legislation.”); Daniel R. Mandelker,
The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010) (“[NEPA], the Magna Carta of environmental
law, requires all federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their
actions[.]”); Jean M. Emery, Comment, Environmental Impact Statements and Critical
Habitat: Does NEPA Apply to the Designation of Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 973, 973–74 (1996) (“Hailed by some as the
Magna Carta of environmental legislation, [NEPA] entered the American scene
unheralded and uncontested. President Nixon and the 91st Congress viewed the bill as
an innocuous, vague statement of idealistic vision, passing it with little debate. Yet,
this ‘paper tiger’ turned out to have some very long teeth.”); Sam Kalen, The APA’s
Influence on the Development of the National Environmental Policy Act, NAT. RES. &
ENV., Spring 2009, at 3 (“When Congress passed NEPA it became touted as the Magna
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declining reputation. Students are always disappointed to
learn that the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that NEPA
does not equip courts to reverse agency decisions that injure
the environment. 3 One student succinctly summed up the
disappointment in a comment to Professor Oliver Houck on an
Environmental Law exam: “NEPA: you can kill all the deer, so
Carta of environmental laws, yet by 1980 the Act had become a process-oriented
statute rather than a substantive policy governing federal agency decisions.”); Jenna
Musselman, Comment, Safetea-Lu’s Environmental Streamlining: Missing
Opportunities for Meaningful Reform, 33 ECOL. L.Q. 825, 856 (2006) (“As the ‘Magna
Carta’ of U.S. environmental law, NEPA was supposed to provide an environmental
charter that would integrate environmental values into all levels of federal agencies
and make the environment a key concern in all federal decision-making.”).
3. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978) (“[The purpose of NEPA] is to insure a fully informed and well-considered
decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court
would have reached had they been members of the decision making unit of the
agency.”); see also James Allen, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion of
Remote and Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. LAND, RES., & ENVTL. L. 287, 298 (2005)
(“The concept of a remote and speculative alternative has become a mainstay of NEPA
alternatives litigation, and Vermont Yankee is regularly cited for the proposition that
such alternatives need not be considered in a NEPA analysis.”); Strycker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980) (“[O]nce an agency
has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a
court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it
cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of
the action to be taken.’” (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)));
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“[I]t is now
well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process.”). Note that in the first few years of NEPA litigation,
the D.C. Circuit thought that consideration of an agency’s NEPA decision for
procedural compliance was a substantive review, albeit one limited to the adequacy of
the agency’s of the breadth of environmental considerations. See Calvert Cliffs’
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (“[I]f the decision was reached procedurally without individualized
consideration and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in good
faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.”); Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz,
382 F. Supp. 362, 374–75 (D.D.C. 1974), opinion adopted in part, 539 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (“In its review of the agency’s decision, the Court is obligated to consider the
substantive decision on the merits to see if it is in accord with NEPA’s requirements…
The Court’s review, however, is a limited one for the purpose of determining whether
the agency reached its decision after full, good faith consideration of the
environmental factors.”); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 459 F. Supp. 188,
193–94 (D.D.C. 1978) (“Most courts that have considered the issue have held that
agency decisions to take action on projects having a significant environmental impact
may be reviewed substantively by the courts to ensure that the decision was not
arbitrary and capricious.”). The D.C. Circuit’s language may have implied that NEPA
was both a substantive and a procedural law, but the Supreme Court held that judicial
review under NEPA is procedural in Vermont Yankee: “NEPA does set forth significant
substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural.” 435 U.S. at 558.
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long as you write it down.”4
Defenders of NEPA nevertheless maintain that by requiring
federal agencies to anticipate the adverse effects of their
proposals in advance, 5 NEPA authorizes the public and other
agencies to participate in decision making, often uncovers
other statutory violations, and opens up courthouse doors for
challenges to government actions. The latter result, some
NEPA defenders have pointed out, has created a kind of
common law of the environment, 6 since the factual context for
NEPA cases continuously changes, enabling courts to either
engage in “soft glance” or “hard look” review of whether agency

4. See E-mail from Oliver A. Houck, Professor of Law, Tulane University Law
School, to Envlawprofessors (Dec. 19, 2011, 20:15 CDT) (on file with author), referring
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 350–51
(stating that the Forest Service could permit construction of a ski facility at Sandy
Butte, even if it would result in a total loss of the local mule deer herd, and still be in
compliance with NEPA).
5. As Robert Dreher has noted, “NEPA gives effect to the common-sense axiom ‘look
before you leap.’ The Act does not require federal agencies to choose an
environmentally-friendly course over a less environmentally-friendly option. But, as a
practical matter, the requirement to prepare an EIS ensures that agency decisions will
reflect environmental values.” ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE
POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 3 (2005), available
at http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2005-nepaundersiege.pdf.
6. Justice Marshall noted that “[NEPA] seems designed to serve as no more than a
catalyst for development of a ‘common law’ of NEPA. To date, the courts have
responded in just that manner and have created such a ‘common law.’ Indeed, that
development is the source of NEPA’s success.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421
(1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation
omitted); See also Jeannette MacMillan, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses
in Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks
(Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOL. L.Q. 491, 522 (2005) (“Even
NEPA’s procedural instructions leave many holes . . . . Courts have taken this
opportunity to create an extensive ‘common law’ of NEPA.”); Peter S. Knapman,
Comment, A Suggested Framework for Judicial Review of Challenges to the Adequacy
of an Environmental Impact Statement Prepared Under the Hawaii Environmental
Policy Act, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 719, 725 (1996) (“Since NEPA was enacted there have
been a large number of cases litigated under the statute. This has created a significant
body of NEPA ‘common law,’ which is an important addition to the text of the statute
and accompanying regulations.”); Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate,
Learning from NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 93, 125 (1999) (“NEPA and its common law can serve as instructive models for
federal risk legislation.”); David M. Shea, Note, The Project Bioshield Prisoner’s
Dilemma: An Impetus for the Modernization of Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statements, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 695, 735 (2006) (“[W]hile there currently
exists a vast body of NEPA common law, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to
reduce the burdens of environmental litigation by broadcasting its preference that
CEQ’s regulations be given substantial deference.”).
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proposals complied with NEPA procedures. 7 The results can
give NEPA decisions an aura of unpredictability, perhaps
suggesting that the results of the case law are more a
consequence of the underlying merits of the agency proposal,
the nature of the opposition, or the subjective views of the
reviewing court.
Without quarreling with the notion that NEPA cases are
highly fact-specific, the fact that there is NEPA law protective
of the environment is often overlooked. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit has created a considerable amount of NEPA case law
that achieves the overarching statutory goal of ensuring that
federal actions produce “conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony.” 8 The court has
proved unwilling to allow economic, profit-seeking interests to
file NEPA suits 9 or use NEPA to delay critical habitat
designations
under
the
Endangered
Species
Act
(ESA). 10 Similarly, a plaintiff need only show that “substantial
questions” about the effect of the action exist when claiming
that a proposed action is “significant,” and therefore requires
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 11 In

7. For examples of so-called “soft glance” review, affirming the agency proposal, see
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1240 (D.
Wyo. 2008), aff’d sub nom, BioDiversity Conservation Alliance v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 608 F.3d 709 (10th Cir. 2010) (in a challenge to the BLM’s approval of project
to develop thousands of coalbed methane wells in Wyoming and Montana, the district
court stated that “the voluminous administrative record in this case, which includes
twenty compact disks of information, belies the assertion that the BLM did not take a
hard look at the potential environmental consequences of the proposed project.”);
Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1994) (an
EIS prepared prior to the Federal Highway Administration’s decision to approve a toll
road that analyzed “all the alternatives that were feasible and briefly discusse[d] the
reasons others were eliminated” was sufficient to comply with NEPA). “Hard look”
review cases include Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.
2005) (Navy’s EIS in support of decision to build aircraft landing training field near a
national wildlife refuge had “deficiencies in each area of the Navy’s analysis would not,
on their own, be sufficient to invalidate the EIS. But a review of the various
components of the EIS taken together indicate[d] that the Navy did not conduct the
‘hard look’ that NEPA requires.”), and Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that cumulative impact analysis
contained in EIS on decision to approve timber sales in national forest was
inadequate).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006).
9. See infra notes 19–78 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 79–115 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 116–52 and accompanying text.
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addition, the appropriate range of alternatives an EIS must
consider, the heart of an EIS, 12 is less expansive concerning
agency proposals protecting the environment than those
harming the environment. 13
These Ninth Circuit interpretations have together created a
body of NEPA law that favors positive environmental
outcomes. None of them transgresses the Supreme Court’s
proscription against courts reversing agency decisions on their
substantive environmental merits. 14 But collectively they
make it difficult for those whose interest is in private profit,
not ecological protection, to use NEPA for their economic
purposes. The decisions also facilitate government actions
protecting the environment. If other circuits widely adopted
these Ninth Circuit rules, NEPA’s reputation as a paper tiger,
imposing only red tape on government action, 15 would
diminish.
Arguably, NEPA’s language in section 101, which is
routinely ignored by the courts, aims to ensure that federal
actions foster environmental quality. 16 Section 102(1) of the
statute, also largely overlooked by the courts, reinforces this
notion by calling for agencies to pursue actions consistent with
NEPA’s environmental policies. 17 But until these provisions

12. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012).
13. See infra notes 153–92 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3.
15. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S.
Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act,
25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 12 (2006) (“[The Supreme Court] must provide some
mechanism for NEPA to be more than a ‘paper tiger.’”); William Murray Tabb, The
Role of Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 190
(1997) (asking “[h]as NEPA become a ‘paper tiger’ after all?” and recommending a
“comprehensive, multi-factored approach” to determining whether an action is “highly
controversial”); see also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the inclusion of the phrase
“to the fullest extent possible” in section 102 of NEPA “does not make NEPA’s
procedural requirements somehow ‘discretionary.’ Congress did not intend the Act to
be such a paper tiger”).
16. “[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all
practicable means . . . to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . attain the widest range of beneficial
uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other
undesirable and unintended consequences.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006).
17. “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/1

6

Blumm and Mosman: The Overlooked Role of the National Environmental Policy Act in P

2012]

NEPA IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

199

are judicially exhumed from the statutory grave, decisions like
those discussed in this article offer the best opportunity for the
Magna Charta of the U.S. environment to achieve its
protective goals.
This article discusses four prominent Ninth Circuit rules of
NEPA interpretation that foster federal government action to
protect the environment. Section I explains the court’s
decisions concerning the prudential rule that only those
plaintiffs within “the zone of interests” of the statute have
standing to invoke court review. Section II explores the
requirement that agency actions triggering NEPA’s
requirements must have a physical effect on the environment,
not merely work a legal change protecting the environment,
like designating critical habitat under the ESA. Section III
discusses the burden-shifting effect that occurs when a
plaintiff challenges an agency’s determination that a proposed
action is not “significant” by showing that “substantial
questions” about the effect of the proposal exist. When the
court determines that such questions are present, the agency
must then demonstrate that the questions raised are not
“substantial,” or it must prepare an EIS. Section IV focuses on
NEPA’s key requirement to analyze alternatives, which in the
Ninth Circuit may be less expansive in the case of government
actions that foster environmental protection than those that
undermine it. We conclude by suggesting that these four Ninth
Circuit rules have helped NEPA protect the Western
environment, and if they were embraced by other circuits,
would restore some of NEPA’s promise as articulated by a
prescient Congress over forty years ago. 18
II.

STANDING UNDER NEPA’S “ZONE OF INTERESTS”:
EXCLUDING PECUNIARY INTERESTS

According to Professor Doremus, standing to file suit
“remains the most persistent constitutional quandary of

administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. §
4332 (2006).
18. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 40,924 (daily ed. Dec. 22,1969) (statement of Rep.
Dingell) (“[T]he passage of this legislation will constitute one of the most significant
steps ever taken in the field of conservation . . . it will offer us an opportunity to carry
out the policies and goals set forth in the bill to provide each citizen of this great
country a healthful environment.”).
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environmental law.” 19 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 20 a long line of Supreme Court cases—
many involving issues affecting the environment—have
established
a three-pronged
test
for constitutional
standing. 21 Additionally, courts have imposed a series of
“prudential” standing requirements. 22 The contours of
prudential standing may remain imprecise, 23 but plaintiffs
alleging statutory violations must show that they are
“arguably within the zone of interests” the statute

19. Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem of Standing in Environmental Law, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,956 (2010).
20. 405 U.S. 727, 737–39 (1972) (refusing to grant the Sierra Club standing to
challenge approval of the Disney Corporation’s plan to develop a ski resort on Mineral
King mountain, but allowing the club to amend its complaint to show that its members
used the Mineral King environment and would suffer aesthetic injuries if that
environment were degraded, thereby creating user-based standing for the organization
that would satisfy the constitutional requirement of a concrete “controversy”).
21. The three elements required to establish constitutional standing are (1) that the
party has suffered an “injury in fact,” which is “an invasion of a judicially cognizable
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) that the injury is “fairly traceable” to actions of the
defendant; and (3) that the injury is likely to “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (“Over the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact. . . . Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third . . . that the
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” (internal citations omitted)); Maine
People’s Alliance & Natural Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 283
(1st Cir. 2006) (“Those requirements are expressed in a familiar three-part algorithm:
a would-be plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a
causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant’s actions,
and a likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.”).
22. Concerning prudential standing, a court asks “whether the constitutional or
statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500 (1975). Included among the requirements for prudential standing are that: (1)
“when the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant
exercise of jurisdiction,” (2) “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties,” and (3) that “a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall within the zone of
interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee
invoked in the suit.” Id. at 499. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)).
23. Doremus, supra note 19, at 10,957 (noting that the lack of precision in the
doctrine is largely due to a “closely, but deeply, divided” Supreme Court, which has
issued “a progression of 5-4 decisions that do not make a coherent whole”).
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recognized. 24
In the case of NEPA, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted this
prudential standing test to exclude plaintiffs whose interest in
invoking the statute is pecuniary and unconnected to any
legitimate environmental concerns, as claims by such plaintiffs
are inconsistent with NEPA’s environmental purpose. 25 By its
own terms, NEPA announced a national policy to “encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation.” 26 In addition to considering a
challenge to a plaintiff’s prudential standing, courts often
address the purpose of NEPA. 27 The Council on Environmental
Quality’s regulations implementing the statute clarify that
“NEPA’s purpose is not to generate paperwork—even excellent
paperwork—but to foster excellent action.” 28 As the CEQ
24. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (first
articulating the “zone of interests” test for statutory standing, interpreting the
Administrative Procedure Act to grant standing to those “aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute”).
25. See Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 473–74 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussed at
infra notes 35–46 and accompanying text). Unlike constitutional standing, Congress
can limit or eliminate prudential standing. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (“unlike their
constitutional counterparts, [prudential standing requirements] can be modified or
abrogated by Congress”). Examples of statutes that abrogate prudential standing
include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which states that “any person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person… who is alleged to
be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition,
or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)
(2006); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, which contains highly similar language at 42 U.S.C. § 9659. Courts have
confirmed that “Congress has abrogated the prudential standing requirements under
these statutes,” see, e.g., DMJ Associates, L.L.C. v. Capasso, 288 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). NEPA also established a Council on Environmental
Quality that promulgated regulations implementing NEPA procedures in 1978. See 40
C.F.R. § 1500 (2012).
27. See, e.g., Mun. of Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1329 (9th Cir.
1992) (“The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that federal agencies consider the
environmental impact of their actions.”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 812 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We hold that here the [inaccurate economic
information relied upon by the Forest Service] was sufficiently significant that it
subverted NEPA’s purpose of providing decision makers and the public with an
accurate assessment of the information relevant to evaluate the Tongass Plan.”).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2012) (“The NEPA process is intended to help public
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regulations illustrate, NEPA’s purpose of environmental
protection is advanced through the statute’s procedures, which
require
thorough
analysis
of
environmental
consequences. 29 The Supreme Court has similarly stated that
protection of the physical environment is NEPA’s purpose. 30
The Ninth Circuit has sometimes characterized NEPA’s
purpose as simply informational, 31 explaining that NEPA’s
purpose requires action agencies to develop and publicly
disclose information about the environmental consequences of
their proposals in order to prevent unforeseen environmentally
destructive results. 32 However, the court also recognizes the
officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.
These regulations provide the direction to achieve this purpose.”).
29. Id. (“The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that
are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that
protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”).
30. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773 (1983)
(“[A]lthough NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare,
these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of protecting the
physical environment”) (discussed infra notes 102–4 and accompanying text).
31. See Columbia Basin Land Prot. Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th Cir.
1981) (ruling that an EIS on a Memo of Understanding between the Bureau of Land
Management and the Bureau of Reclamation, in addition to the EIS prepared on the
relevant action of constructing transmission lines, was not required); “The purpose of
NEPA is to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the present and future
environmental impact of their decisions. Additionally, the preparation of an EIS
ensures that other officials, Congress, and the public can evaluate the environmental
consequences independently.” Id. (citing Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir.
1974) (en banc) (determining that NEPA applies to state projects that received federal
grants after NEPA’s passage and that NEPA documents must be made available to the
public prior to hearings)); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.
1988) (concluding that substantial questions about the effects of paving a road in a
national forest required preparation of an EIS) (“An assessment must be ‘prepared
early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the
decision making process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already
made.’” (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1987))).
32. Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2000)
(deciding that the Forest Service’s decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS on
timber sales in Nez Perce National Forest violated NEPA) (“NEPA’s purpose is to
ensure that ‘the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its
decision after it is too late to correct.’” (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490
U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (holding that the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision not to
prepare a supplemental EIS on the Elk Creek Dam in Oregon’s Rogue River Basin
after being presented with new information was not arbitrary and capricious)); Ground
Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
2004) (concluding that the Navy was not required to complete NEPA analysis for
submarine base missile deployment decisions) (“NEPA’s purpose is to ensure that
federal agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences before committing to
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broader purpose of NEPA to protect the environment 33 and
generally approaches the Act with this purpose in mind.
Consequently, those who seek to protect the environment for
their own use and enjoyment are clearly within the zone of
interests that NEPA aimed to protect, and therefore they may
invoke its procedures in court. 34 But those who seek to enforce
NEPA purely for profit fall outside the statute’s zone of
interests under a longstanding Ninth Circuit rule.35
A.

Excluding Purely Pecuniary Interests from NEPA’s Zone of
Interest

The Ninth Circuit’s prudential standing interpretation is
quite venerable, originating in the 1979 decision of Port of
Astoria v. Hodel, where the Port, along with a broadcasting
company, a citizens group, and five individuals all challenged a
proposed power sale contract between the federal Bonneville

action.” (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989)); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of
NEPA is to require disclosure of relevant environmental considerations that were
given a ‘hard look’ by the agency, and thereby to permit informed public comment on
proposed action and any choices or alternatives that might be pursued with less
environmental harm.”); N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d
1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011) (“NEPA aims (1) to ensure that agencies carefully consider
information about significant environmental impacts and (2) to guarantee relevant
information is available to the public.”).
33. See, e.g., Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he overarching purpose of [NEPA is] environmental protection.”) (discussed
further infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l
Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling that agency’s
decision not to prepare an EIS on the corporate average fuel economy standards for
light trucks was “markedly deficient,” and remanding to the agency for preparation of
revised analysis) (“NEPA ‘is our basic national charter for protection of the
environment.’” (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2006))); Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus,
657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981) (“The legislative history also indicates the purpose of
NEPA was to provide a mechanism to enhance or improve the environment and
prevent further irreparable damage.”) (discussed further infra notes 85–89 and
accompanying text).
34. See, e.g., Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The
birdwatchers’ interest in preserving the historic buildings and natural environment of
the Naval Station and preventing adverse environmental effects from its proposed
reuse falls squarely within the zone of interests protected by NEPA.”); City of Las
Vegas, Nev. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 570 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he city
alleges a concrete injury to its interests in the environment and in safety which falls
within the zone of interests of NEPA.”).
35. See infra notes 36–78 and accompanying text.
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Power Administration (BPA) and an aluminum plant. 36 The
original proposal would have located the plant near Astoria,
along the Columbia River near the Oregon coast, but BPA
changed the location to a site nearly three hundred miles
upriver in Umatilla County, Oregon. 37 Disappointed at this
relocation, the Port and the others filed suit, claiming that
BPA violated NEPA by failing to prepare an environmental
impact statement on the contract, the plant itself, and
associated facilities. 38
The district court agreed that the contract required an EIS
but refused to invalidate it, ruling instead that the contract
was unenforceable without an EIS. 39 The lower court also
concluded that the Port lacked standing to challenge BPA’s
proposal under NEPA because the Port’s sole concern was its
economic injury, 40 although the court upheld the standing of
the other plaintiffs. 41 All of the plaintiffs appealed, seeking
invalidation of the contract. The Port also challenged the lower
court’s ruling denying its standing. 42
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the standing issue, deciding

36. 595 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. See id.
38. The proposal included not only supplying BPA electricity to the plant, but also
the construction of federal transmission lines. Id. Moreover, the power sale contract
actually began the implementation of BPA’s Hydro-Thermal Power Program, under
which BPA promised to help finance some twenty-six new thermal (coal and nuclear)
power plants through power sale contracts like this one. See id. at 477–78. The
connection of the power contract to this program would prove to be its undoing, as the
plant was never constructed. See infra note 47.
39. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, [1975] 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,657 (D. Or.
Aug. 26,1975).
40. Id. at 20,658. (“Economic and environmental interests must be linked under the
NEPA zone of interest. I find the Port, despite allegations to the contrary, is solely
concerned with its pecuniary interest.”).
41. Id. The court concluded that members of the citizen’s group and the individuals
had standing because they “live, work, and/or spend leisure time in Umatilla County.”
The broadcast company had standing because the action threatened to interfere with
its signal and injure its “corporate health.” The court’s distinction between the
broadcast company’s standing and the Port’s lack of standing seemed premised on the
fact that the former’s existing business would be adversely affected by the
environmental effects of the aluminum plant, while the latter’s potential business
expectations were frustrated by the lack of environmental effects, as the plant avoided
its neighborhood.
42. Id. The district court stated that “the Port, despite allegations to the contrary, is
solely concerned with its pecuniary interest . . . The Port of Astoria lacks standing to
bring this action.”
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that the Port’s alleged economic losses due to the relocation of
the plant were insufficient to support NEPA standing. The
court observed that “these alleged injuries represent only
pecuniary losses and frustrated financial expectations that are
not
coupled
with
environmental
considerations . . . .
Consequently, the alleged injuries are outside of NEPA’s zone
of interest and are not sufficient to establish standing.” 43 The
court drew support for its position from decisions in the
District of Columbia, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits. 44
The Ninth Circuit upheld the standing of the other
plaintiffs, including the broadcasting company whose alleged
injuries concerned potential damage to its broadcast signal
from the power lines required by the plant. 45 The court
acknowledged that the broadcaster’s injury “may be classified
as economic.” However, the court determined that the alleged
injury resulted directly from the environmental effects of
building the plant and therefore was “an act that lies within
NEPA’s embrace.” 46 The court then considered the merits of
the case and affirmed the district court’s decision that the
contract was unenforceable prior to BPA’s preparation of an
EIS on the construction of the plant. 47
43. Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475.
44. Id. (citing Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(upholding standing of property owner challenging new federal building construction
that would house federal offices currently in property holder’s buildings, but
recognizing that “an allegation of injury to monetary interest alone may not bring a
party within the zone of environmental interests as contemplated by NEPA for the
purposes of standing”)); Clinton Cmty. Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Med. Ctr., 374 F.
Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974), aff’d, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1048 (1975) (denying standing to hospital operators challenging construction of
competing hospital); Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 424–25 (8th Cir. 1977)
(granting standing to property owners whose property was to be condemned for a
development because “their environmental concerns are not so insignificant that they
ought to be disregarded altogether.”)). The Port also argued that it should have NEPA
standing because it had pollution control authority under the state’s statute defining
the authority of ports over harbors (OR. REV. STAT. § 777.120(2)), citing NEPA’s
language of involving local agencies in its processes. Port of Astoria, at 475 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969)). But the court rejected this argument, noting that the
Port’s minor environmental protection role was entirely discretionary. Id. at 475–76.
45. Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 476. The citizens group and the individual plaintiffs
living in the vicinity of the proposed plant successfully argued that they would suffer
“ecological and aesthetic injuries” from the physical presence of the plant. Id.
46. Id. (“[T]he injury is the immediate and direct result of the building of the
Alumax plant, an action that ‘will have a primary impact on the natural
environment.’”).
47. Id. at 479–80. In related litigation, environmentalists successfully argued that
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B.

The Influence of Port of Astoria in the Ninth Circuit

The Port of Astoria rule—denying NEPA standing to those
with only pecuniary interests unconnected to legitimate
environmental concerns—has been Ninth Circuit law for over
thirty years. The rule has been applied in a number of ensuing
cases. For example, in Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Service, the court held that an organization of ranchers with
permits to graze on federal lands lacked standing to challenge
the Forest Service’s Land and Resource Management Plan for
the Toiyabe National Forest. 48 The Ninth Circuit noted that
the organization “cannot invoke NEPA to prevent ‘lifestyle
loss’ when the lifestyle in question is damaging to the
environment.” 49 A similar outcome occurred when an electric
utility challenged an EIS prepared by the Forest Service for
the approval of an oil pipeline likely to interfere with the
utility’s electricity transmission in City of Los Angeles v. U.S.
Department of Agriculture. 50 The Central District of California
ruled that the utility lacked standing because its primarily
economic claims conflicted with the public interest in the
environment, and therefore were likely to frustrate the
purposes of NEPA. 51
In Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United
Stockgrowers of America v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, a
group of cattle producers challenged a rule that allowed

the program of which the proposed aluminum plant power-supply contract was a part
also required an EIS. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or.
1977), aff’d, 626 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1980) (requiring that BPA prepare an EIS on its
Hydro-Thermal Power Program, which envisioned twenty-six new coal and nuclear
plants); BPA thus could not implement the power contract for the proposed aluminum
plant without completing this program EIS. It took BPA several years to complete the
EIS, and by the time the agency did, the proponents of the plant scrapped it, and the
plant was never built. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s Hydroelectric
Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58
WASH. L. REV. 175, 226–27 (1983). The litigation was ultimately held to be moot,
following adoption of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839–839h). Natural Res. Def. Council v. Munro, 520 F.
Supp. 17 (D. Or. 1981).
48. 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 716.
50. 950 F. Supp. 1005 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
51. Id. at 1012–14. The court explained that NEPA advances “a general public
interest in the environment,” and that the utility’s “economic interests are of such
magnitude as to render” the claims in conflict with NEPA. Id. at 1013.
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resumption of Canadian beef imports under NEPA. 52 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the cattle producers had alleged only
economic harms and a vague concern for human health and
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease”
contamination. 53 The court concluded that concerns about foodborne illnesses were outside the scope of NEPA, 54 and
consequently the cattlemen lacked standing under NEPA
because they had “no claimed or apparent environmental
interest,” and were therefore outside NEPA’s zone of interest. 55
These decisions, among others, 56 retained the rationale of
Port of Astoria. The Ninth Circuit viewed NEPA as a means to
advance
environmental
protection,
not
economic
interests. 57 This view remained unchallenged until the Eighth
Circuit took a contrary position in 1999. 58

52. 415 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005).
53. Id. at 1103 (“R-CALF points to only one paragraph in its complaint to justify its
standing under NEPA. Every allegation in this paragraph, however, concerns the
economic interest of R-CALF members except the following: ‘R-CALF USA members
will also be adversely affected by the increased risk of disease they face when
Canadian beef enters the U.S. meat supply.’”).
54. Id. (“R-CALF’s claimed interest, however, has no connection to the physical
environment; rather, it is solely a matter of human health.”).
55. Id. at 1103–04 (citing Town of Stratford, Conn. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 285
F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
56. Other Ninth Circuit decisions following the Port of Astoria rule include W. Radio
Services Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996) (telecommunications company lacked
standing to challenge Forest Service’s decision to issue a special-use permit for a
competitor to relocate their radio tower facility in the Ochoco National Forest under
NEPA. The court noting that the plaintiffs admitted that their “sole complaint was
alleged interference, which we have held is purely economic” Id. at 903); Arizona
Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Cartwright, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1109 (D. Ariz. 1998)
(ranchers challenging adoption of regional grazing management standards by the
Forest Service “must allege an environmental injury to have standing under NEPA.”
denied standing under NEPA); Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Haw. 2002) (denying standing to plaintiffs
claiming ownership of a reef over which the Department of Interior had established a
National Wildlife Refuge because “[t]here is no evidence that Plaintiffs have any
environmental or conservation interest in Kingman Reef, or that preserving the
environment is part of their mission.” Id. at 1185–86).
57. “The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests
of those adversely affected by agency decisions.” Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866
F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) (abrogated on other grounds, Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)).
58. Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.
1999).
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C.

Reaffirming the Port of Astoria Rule After its Rejection by
the Eighth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit adhered to the reasoning of Port of
Astoria despite Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v.
Dombeck, 59 a contrary 1999 decision of the Eighth Circuit. In
Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness, the Eighth Circuit
held that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bennett v.
Spear, 60 NEPA’s zone of interests included economic interests,
at least where the challenge concerned the economic analysis
of an EIS. 61 The Eighth Circuit granted standing to a group of
plaintiffs consisting of counties, outfitters, and concerned
citizens who filed the challenge because the EIS in question
included analysis of the economic implications of the
considered alternatives. 62 In Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v.
Norton, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its rule that purely
economic interests may not use NEPA to challenge federal
proposals, expressly rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in
Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness. 63
In Ashley Creek, a private landowner challenged a Bureau of
Land Management EIS on a federal permit to Agrium Conda
Phosphate Operations, a phosphate miner and fertilizer
manufacturer whose mine was near the habitat of Canada
lynx, an ESA-listed species. 64 The landowner maintained that
the EIS failed to consider the alternative of purchasing the
fertilizer from the landowner’s private lands containing
phosphate deposits. 65 The fertilizer manufacturer had
59. Id.
60. 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (granting standing to irrigators challenging a biological
opinion under the Endangered Species Act).
61. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were within NEPA’s zone of interest
because one of the “explicit policies of NEPA” is to “fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans,” and the plaintiffs’
challenge to the validity of the data relied upon by the agency furthered that policy.
Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness, 164 F.3d at 1126 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)
(1969)).
62. Id.
63. 420 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2005).
64. See id. at 936.
65. See id. (“Ashley Creek submitted a letter commenting that the draft EIS was
deficient because it did not consider as an alternative the possibility of mining the
Vernal deposits that Ashley Creek controls. Ashley Creek wrote that the Vernal
deposits were not only cost-effective, but were also environmentally superior to the
proposed action.”).
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previously rejected this alternative as cost-prohibitive because
the site was not prepared for mining operations. 66 The district
court dismissed the landowner’s NEPA claim because the
alleged injury was purely economic, and thus outside the
statute’s zone of interests. 67
The landowner appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on
both constitutional and prudential standing grounds.68
Concerning the latter, the landowner argued that the Ninth
Circuit should adopt the Eighth Circuit’s approach, allowing
purely economic challenges to an EIS because of the
requirement that an EIS consider “long-term productivity”
encompassed pecuniary interests within NEPA’s zone of
interest. 69
The Ninth Circuit rejected the landowner’s argument that it
should interpret the specific requirements for the kinds of
analysis in an EIS separately from the statute’s overarching
environmental goal. 70 The court explained that “we disagree
with our sister circuit that [section] 102 protects purely
economic interests or that it can be severed from NEPA’s
overarching [environmental] purpose.”71 The court also noted
that the landowner never even presented a pretense of
environmental concern. 72 Thus, the Ashley Creek court
reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s fidelity to the Port of Astoria

66. See id.
67. Id. at 937.
68. The Ninth Circuit stated that: “We have long described the zone of interests that
NEPA protects as being environmental.” Id. at 940. On the constitutional standing
issue, the court ruled that the landowner, located some 250 miles from the proposed
mining on federal lands, lacked a “geographic nexus” necessary to show a concrete
injury in the case, and therefore lacked Article III standing. Id. at 938.
69. See id. at 940–41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969) (requiring that an EIS
consider “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented”)).
70. Id. at 944–45 (“In contrast to the ESA, under which the substantive goals of an
individual provision may have a more specific objective than the overarching goal of
the statute and may be analyzed independently, § 102 of NEPA cannot be separated
from the statute’s overarching purpose of environmental protection because it is
designed to further that purpose.”).
71. Id. at 942.
72. Id.
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precedent and reiterated its rule that a pecuniary concern is
not a sufficient basis to challenge a federal proposal under
NEPA. 73
D.

The Effect of the Ninth Circuit’s “Zone of Interests” NEPA
Rule

Ashley Creek’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s threedecade old Port of Astoria rule reflects a judicial commitment
to NEPA’s purpose of environmental protection. 74 The
Supreme Court may or may not share the Ninth Circuit’s view
of NEPA, 75 but the Ninth Circuit’s position reflects the purpose

73. Id. at 945 (“In light of the purpose of § 102(2)(C)—protection of the
environment—and the specific statutory requirements for the content of an EIS, we
hold that a purely economic injury that is not intertwined with an environmental
interest does not fall within § 102’s zone of interests.”).
74. Courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to follow this rule. See Am. Indep. Mines &
Minerals Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1251 (D. Idaho 2010)
(denying standing to mining companies challenging a Forest Service EIS on its “travel
management rule,” which required the Service to designate certain roads open for
motor vehicles, and prohibited vehicle use on any other roads or off-road, because they
had “not linked their pecuniary interest in mineral resource development to the
physical environment or to an environmental interest contemplated by NEPA”); W.
Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 08-6359-HO, 2010 WL 1169794, at *6 (D. Or.
2010) (telecommunications company and its owner lacked standing to challenge Forest
Service’s decision to allow BPA to construct a telecommunications facility in the
Deschutes National Forest because the plaintiffs’ interests did “not appear to fall into
either the NFMA or NEPA zones of interest”).
75. See Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S.
Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507
(2012) (arguing that the government’s “perfect” NEPA record in the Supreme Court is
more nuanced and the Court is less consistently hostile to the statute than is generally
appreciated; the poor record of plaintiffs is due in large measure to the persuasiveness
of the U.S. Solicitor General and the influence of former Chief Justice Rehnquist);
Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 231, 236 (2012) (“The basic statistics are striking: in the seventeen NEPA cases
the Supreme Court has decided on the merits, the federal government has won every
single one. In none of those cases were environmental groups the petitioner, for in all
seventeen, the environmentalist plaintiffs had won below and therefore had
everything to lose before the Court. And, that is exactly what they did: lose.
Amazingly, from 1976 until the Court decided Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. in November 2008, environmentalists lost all their cases unanimously,
without obtaining a single vote of a single Justice.”); David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme
Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L.
551, 553 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has never decided a case, or for that matter a
single issue in a case, in favor of a NEPA plaintiff.”); Jeannette MacMillan, Note, An
International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA,
NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks (Department of Transportation v. Public
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of the statute as described by Congress: to establish a national
policy to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment.” 76 Although the statute is
primarily procedural in nature, it is clear that Congress
intended for federal agencies to use NEPA for environmental
preservation and restoration. 77
Without an emphasis on the environmental purpose of
NEPA, the statute could be employed—as it may now be in the
Eighth Circuit—by economic interests to obstruct federal
proposals that are inconsistent with their profit-seeking
motives. Congress had no intention of protecting such interests
when it enacted NEPA. 78 In the Ninth Circuit, this sort of
obstructionism has not been possible, which has prevented the
nation’s chief generic commitment to the environment from
becoming an obstacle available to economic interests.
III. GIVING LEGAL PROTECTION TO THE EXISTING
ENVIRONMENT: AN INSUFFICIENT NEPA TRIGGER
The contentious fight in the Pacific Northwest over the
listing of the northern spotted owl under the ESA produced
considerable litigation. 79 After the listing, the district court for
Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 521 (2005) (“After a few years of generous
interpretation by the lower courts, the Supreme Court began deciding against NEPA
plaintiffs. Because courts are the major enforcers of NEPA’s environmental mandate,
judicial hostility to expansive readings of NEPA has doomed a substantive role for the
statute.”); Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S.
Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act,
25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 10 (2006) (“the goals of NEPA have had difficulty gaining
substantive enforcement by the United States Supreme Court”).
76. 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2006).
77. See supra note 27; 115 CONG. REC. 40,417 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (statement of
Sen. Jackson) (“The needs and the aspirations of future generations make it our duty
to build a sound and operable foundation of national objectives for the management of
our resources for our children and their children. The future of succeeding generations
in this country is in our hands. It will be shaped by the choices we make. We will not,
and they cannot escape the consequences of our choices.”).
78. See 115 CONG. REC. 40,925 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep.
Mailliard) (“This legislation stands as a commitment of the Federal Government to the
American people that the quality of life in this country in terms of its basic
environmental components will be restored and maintained for our own benefit and
that of succeeding generations of succeeding generations of Americans.”).
79. For a history of the spotted owl listing, see Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests,
Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land Law, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605 (1990);
Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the “Spotted Owl Problem”: Learning from the Old-Growth
Controversy, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 261 (1993); Victor M. Sher, Travels with Strix:
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the Western District of Washington ordered the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) to designate critical habitat for the
species. 80 Several counties challenged the failure to apply
NEPA procedures to the critical habitat designation in court.
A.

NEPA and Preserving the Status Quo

In Douglas County v. Lujan, two Oregon counties challenged
the procedure used to designate critical habitat for the
Northern Spotted Owl, seeking injunctive relief. 81 A previous
court decision imposed a short timeline for the
designation. 82 In its proposed habitat designation, FWS
decided not to prepare an environmental assessment, 83 citing
the conclusions of CEQ 84 and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus. 85
In Pacific Legal Foundation, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the listing of a species under the ESA did not require an
EIS because an EIS would advance neither the purposes of the
ESA 86 nor NEPA. 87 Instead, a listing made without an EIS

The Spotted Owl’s Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 41
(1993); Brendon Swedlow, Scientists, Judges, and Spotted Owls: Policymakers in the
Pacific Northwest, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187 (2003).
80. N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 629 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
81. 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1472 (D. Or. 1992). The court considered a challenge to the
county’s standing as purely economic; it decided that the county’s claims were within
NEPA’s zone of interest as it has “an environmental interest in managing the fish and
wildlife within its boundaries.” Id. at 1476–77.
82. The Western District of Washington had given FWS less than three months to
publish a proposed rule. N. Spotted Owl, 758 F. Supp. at 629–30.
83. Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 56
Fed. Reg. 20,816, 20,824 (May 6, 1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
84. In announcing the new policy, FWS stated that it had accepted “CEQ’s judgment
that Section 4 listing actions are exempt from NEPA review ‘as a matter of law.’”
Notice Regarding Preparation of Environmental Assessments for Listing Actions
Under the Endangered Species Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (Oct. 25, 1983) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The court noted that the CEQ is charged with administering
NEPA, and thus CEQ’s “interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference.”
Douglas Cnty. v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1474 (1992) (quoting Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)).
85. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
86. The court stated that the purposes of the ESA “are to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, to provide a program for conservation, and to achieve the purposes of the
treaties and conventions signed with foreign countries to conserve various species.” Id.
at 835.
87. According to the court, “NEPA is primarily a procedural statute to insure that
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would further NEPA’s purpose to protect the environment
from irreparable damage. 88 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that requiring an EIS under NEPA to make a listing decision
under the ESA would be inconsistent with the purposes of both
statutes. 89
In Douglas County v. Lujan, the district court rejected the
reasoning of Pacific Legal Foundation, distinguishing the
listing of a species under the ESA from the designation of
critical habitat under the ESA. The court concluded that
because FWS has more discretion when considering the
designation of critical habitat, prior NEPA analysis would
improve the agency’s ultimate decision and would not conflict
with the requirements of the ESA.90
FWS had argued that, even without an EIS, designating
critical habitat advances the policy goals of NEPA. 91 But Ninth
Circuit case law holds that Congress intended NEPA to inform
both the government and the public of the likely
environmental effects of agency actions. 92 Therefore, the
district court reasoned, even an action maintaining the
environmental status quo requires NEPA analysis to
an agency considers the environmental impact. The impact statement is evidence that
environmental concerns were considered by the agency.” Id. at 836.
88. Id. at 835–37. The court stated that “[t]he purposes of NEPA are to declare a
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; to promote prevention or elimination of damage to the
environment and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of ecological systems and natural resources; and to establish a Council
on Environmental Quality . . . . The legislative history also indicates the purpose of
NEPA was to provide a mechanism to enhance or improve the environment and
prevent further irreparable damage.” Id. at 837.
89. The court reasoned that “[t]o require EPA to file an impact statement [for
actions taken under the Clean Air Act] would only hinder its efforts at attaining the
goal of improving the environment. That same rationale applies to actions of the
Secretary of the Interior when he lists species as endangered or threatened in such
action, the Secretary is charged solely with protecting the environment.” Id.
90. Douglas Cnty. v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1479 (1992). FWS argued that when
designating critical habitat, as in a listing decision, the agency lacked discretion to
consider many of the factors weighed in a NEPA analysis. In response, the court
focused on the ESA’s language allowing FWS to consider “economic impact and any
other relevant impact” when establishing critical habitat. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(2) (2006)).
91. Id. at 1481.
92. Id. (referring to Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974)
(ruling that the EIS on the construction of Teton dam and reservoir contained
adequately detailed analysis of the alternatives and cost-benefit considerations, and
was properly limited to just the first phase of construction).
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determine
and
disclose
the
likely
environmental
consequences. 93 Consequently, the court enjoined the critical
habitat designation pending NEPA analysis. 94
B.

Exempting Critical Habitat Designations From NEPA

In Douglas County v. Babbitt, 95 the FWS appealed the
injunction granted by the district court, 96 contending that the
county lacked standing, and that the lower court erred by
concluding that NEPA applied to critical habitat
designations. 97 Additionally, Headwaters, an environmental
intervener, contended that the environment would be fully
protected without an EIS. 98
The Ninth Circuit compared the case to Merrell v. Thomas, 99
which decided that NEPA analysis was not required when the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered pesticides
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA). 100 The court concluded that, as in Merrell,
congressional inaction ratified the FWS’s policy that NEPA did
not apply to critical habitat designations. 101
93. Id. at 1481–82. The court noted that “while some cases have indicated that
agencies whose mission it is to protect the environment are exempt from NEPA
requirements, the Ninth Circuit has applied this rule very narrowly.” Id. at 1481
(referring to Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976)
(holding that all agencies must comply with NEPA’s requirements unless there is a
clear and unavoidable statutory conflict)).
94. Id. at 1485.
95. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995). The incoming Clinton Administration, with Bruce
Babbitt as Secretary of the Interior, continued to defend the critical habitat
designation made under the previous administration of George H.W. Bush; thus, the
change of party name in the Ninth Circuit.
96. Id. at 1497.
97. Id. at 1499.
98. Id. The interveners claimed that “an EIS is not required because the federal
action at issue does not change the natural, physical environment.” According to this
argument, the designation of critical habitat was not a “major action significantly
affecting the human environment,” and therefore did not implicate NEPA. Id. at 1497.
99. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
100. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1502. EPA maintained that actions under
FIFRA were not subject to NEPA procedures, due to the similarity of procedures. Since
Congress did not, in subsequent revisions of FIFRA, require EPA to change policy, the
Merrell court held that this lack of action indicated that Congress did not intend both
statutes to apply to EPA pesticide registrations. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 781.
101. Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1503. Congress amended the ESA after the Pacific
Legal Foundation decision—and after publication of official notice from the Secretary
that NEPA analysis would not be made for critical habitat designations—without
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The Douglas County Ninth Circuit panel proceeded to
discuss the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, in which the
Court ruled that NEPA did not require the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to consider the psychological health effects likely
to be caused by restarting an undamaged reactor at the site of
the Three Mile Island incident. 102 The Supreme Court stated
that while the broad language in NEPA’s statement of policy
refers to “human health and welfare,” the specific goal of
NEPA is to protect the existing environment, and any
resulting benefits to human health are the consequence of that
purpose. 103 Thus, according to the Court, the agency had no
duty to consider the psychological impacts of restarting the
nuclear reactor because the “risk of an accident is not an effect
on the physical environment.” 104 According to the decision,
only federal actions adversely and directly affecting the
existing physical environment trigger NEPA. The court relied
on the Supreme Court’s reasoning to conclude that “an EIS is
unnecessary when the action at issue does not alter the
natural, untouched physical environment at all.” 105 The Ninth
Circuit consequently disagreed with the district court’s
reasoning that inevitable natural changes would trigger
NEPA, holding that actions creating legal protections for an
undisturbed environment do not require NEPA analysis.106
Reversing the lower court, the Ninth Circuit stated that it
would not allow NEPA to be used as an “obstructionist tactic”
acting to change the Department of Interior’s policy. Id. at 1503–04. Additionally, the
court determined that the ESA “displaces NEPA’s procedural and informational
requirements.” Id. at 1503.
102. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
103. Id. at 773 (“although NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health
and welfare, these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of
protecting the physical environment”)).
104. Id. at 775. The Court added that “[w]e believe that the element of risk
lengthens the causal chain beyond the reach of NEPA.” Id.
105. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1505.
106. The court stated, “[W]hen a federal agency takes an action that prevents
human interference with the environment, it need not prepare an EIS.” Id. at 1506.
Returning to the reasoning in Pacific Legal Foundation that was rejected by the
district court, the Ninth Circuit decided that since designation of critical habitat
furthered the purpose of NEPA, requiring an EIS would hinder that purpose. Id.
Reviewing Pacific Legal Foundation, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning applied to the critical habitat designation for the northern spotted
owl. Id. at 1507.
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to prevent environmental protection. 107 As in the Port of
Astoria decision, 108 this result has the effect of simultaneously
limiting NEPA’s scope while strengthening its core mission. By
determining that NEPA analysis need not be performed on
critical habitat designation, the Ninth Circuit denied
challengers a cause of action that could interfere with
designation of critical habitat under the ESA.
C.

The Effect of Not Requiring NEPA Analysis for Protecting
the Existing Environment

The Ninth Circuit continues to follow the holding of Douglas
County that NEPA analysis is not required for critical habitat
designation under the ESA. 109 The rule that actions which
merely preserve the environmental status quo do not require
NEPA analysis also has been applied by courts outside the
Ninth Circuit, but not consistently. 110 For example, the Tenth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case involving the
designation of critical habitat for the spikedace and loach

107. Id. at 1508. The court noted that the concern over use of NEPA to obstruct
environmental protection was first stated by the Sixth Circuit in Pacific Legal
Foundation, adding that “[t]his conclusion is as consistent with legal precedent as it is
with sound policy.” Id.
108. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. One peer reviewer noted that
court’s result—exempting actions giving legal protection to the existing environment
from NEPA analysis—does not necessarily ensure an environmental result. For
example, if the Fish and Wildlife Service gave legal protection in the form of critical
habitat designation only to a portion of the area necessary for spotted owl survival and
recovery, that decision would be shielded from NEPA review.
109. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. CV05-1128-JCC, 2007 WL 1730090, at *13
(W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007) (holding that the promulgation of the National Marine
Fisheries Service’s “evolutionary significant unit” policy, concerning how hatchery fish
should figure into listing decisions under the ESA, did not require the Service to
prepare an EIS because “the Court is persuaded that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Douglas County that the ESA procedures have displaced those in NEPA is equally
applicable to the present case”).
110. See American Sand Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253
(S.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that, although superseded by a subsequently prepared EIS,
the Bureau of Land Management could temporarily close areas to off-highway vehicles
without NEPA analysis); but see Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094,
1114–15 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that by adopting the “roadless rule” for areas of the
national forests (discussed infra notes 167–83 and accompanying text), the Forest
Service would change the environmental status quo, because active forest
management had been practiced for decades, thus refusing to extend the logic of
Douglas County).
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minnow in New Mexico. 111 The court concluded that requiring
NEPA analysis only when an action would result in
environmental harms would undermine NEPA’s purpose,
which the court defined as ensuring that public officials make
choices informed by full knowledge of an action’s
environmental consequences. 112
Similarly, the District of Columbia District Court rejected
the logic of Douglas County in a challenge to the designation of
critical habitat for the wintering piping plover in North
Carolina. 113 The court dismissed the notion that NEPA
analysis need not be prepared for an action that protects the
physical environment, reasoning that NEPA concerns the
quality of the human environment, which may be affected by
placing restrictions on the areas designated as critical
habitat. 114 By determining that NEPA analysis is unnecessary
for critical habitat designations, the Ninth Circuit prevented
NEPA from being used by those who would invoke its
procedures against the environment. 115 When used as a

111. Catron Cnty. Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1436 (1996) (disagreeing with the reasoning in Douglas County).
112. Id. at 1437 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2012)).
113. Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2004).
114. Id. at 136 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit does not contemplate how placing restrictions
on land use which benefit a species may harm the human environment, may
significantly affect it, by preventing or restricting certain activities.”). Recently,
another D.C. district court, while not directly addressing the holding of Douglas
County, rejected an argument that ESA § 4(d) rules allowing ESA “takes” of listed
polar bears are exempt from NEPA because they went through notice and comment
rulemaking, which cited Douglas County. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act
Listing and 4(d) Rule Litigation, 818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 236–37 (D.D.C. 2011). If
the
D.C. Circuit were to affirm this position and reject the holding of Douglas County, the
Ninth Circuit precedent could be functionally overruled, as plaintiffs are always able
to challenge federal agency NEPA compliance in the D.C. Circuit, a result that would
undermine the environmental protection the Ninth Circuit rule provides.
115. One peer reviewer of this article suggested that the result in Douglas County
was explainable by the fact that the plaintiffs in the case were really economic
interests disguised as environmental interests wishing to see more deer and other
species favoring logged-over areas. Thus, it is possible to see Douglas County as a
progeny of Port of Astoria’s hostility to economic interests using NEPA for nonenvironmental ends.
Not all commentators believe that designation of critical habitat is an appropriate
means for furthering the goals of the ESA. See Robert J. Scarpello, Note, Statutory
Redundancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the Endangered Species Act to Exclude
Critical Habitat Designation, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399 (2003) (arguing that
critical habitat should be eliminated, as it drains resources and “serves as nothing
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mechanism to hinder designations, NEPA consumes federal
resources and delays agency actions protecting the
environment.
IV. THE “THRESHOLD” FOR AN EIS: THE
“SIGNIFICANCE” OF A PROPOSED ACTION
When an agency determines that a proposal is likely to
“significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment,”
NEPA requires the agency to prepare an EIS that fully
analyzes the environmental consequences of its proposal. 116 An
agency often prepares an environmental assessment (EA) as
the first step in NEPA analysis. 117 Although an EA can
determine that the agency should prepare an EIS, usually it
justifies a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), 118 which
concludes the NEPA analysis on a proposal. Completing an
EIS often takes years and requires resources that would
otherwise be used elsewhere, so agencies have an incentive to
issue a FONSI whenever possible. Environmental plaintiffs
frequently challenge FONSIs, alleging that a proposal would
actually produce significant environmental effects, and
therefore requires an EIS. Thus, courts must review whether
an agency’s “threshold” decision that a proposed action will not
have significant effects constitutes a violation of NEPA. 119 The
Ninth Circuit’s test for this question—which it has consistently

more than a weapon for environmentalists to block land development”); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-803, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTORS: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE
LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT
DESIGNATIONS 32 (2003) (GAO report to Congress claiming that “Litigation now
dominates the [critical habitat] program, leading the Assistant Secretary for Fish and
Wildlife and Parks in the Department of the Interior to recently declare that the
system for designating critical habitat is ‘broken’ because it provides little
conservation benefit while consuming significant resources”).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2012). An EA is not necessary when the agency initially
decides to prepare an EIS. Id. § 1501.3. The CEQ regulations require neither an EA
nor an EIS to be prepared when an agency determines that the action falls under a
pre-established categorical exclusion. Id. § 1508.4.
118. Id. § 1508.9.
119. Plaintiffs must bring NEPA challenges under the APA because NEPA lacks a
citizen suit provision. The APA prohibits agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2006).
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used for nearly forty years—favors plaintiffs by putting the
burden on the agency to show that there are no significant
effects on the environment. The plaintiff, on the other hand,
need only raise substantial questions about the environmental
consequences of the proposal in order for a court to require
preparation of an EIS.
A.

The Ninth Circuit’s “Substantial Questions” Test

The origin of the Ninth Circuit’s rule about whether an
agency proposal is “significant” lies in City of Davis v.
Coleman, 120 where the court ruled that an EIS is required
when a plaintiff raises “substantial questions” about the
“significant adverse impacts” of a project. 121 The municipality
of Davis, California challenged the construction of a freeway
interchange planned by the Division of Highways of the
California Department of Public Works, and funded in part by
the Federal Highway Administration, because the federal
agency failed to prepare an EIS. 122 The district court ruled that
the City lacked standing to bring the suit, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed and reached the alleged NEPA violation that
the district court avoided. 123 According to the appeals court,
the standard of review for an agency’s decision not to prepare
an EIS requires “a plaintiff [to] ‘allege[] facts which, if true,
show that the proposed project would materially degrade any
aspect of environmental quality.’” 124 Thus, the reviewing court

120. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
121. Id. at 673.
122. Id. at 666. Additionally, the state agency failed to prepare an environmental
impact report (EIR) required by the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970
(CEQA), CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 21100. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 666.
123. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 673. The district court ruled that the city had not shown
injury in fact, but the Ninth Circuit decided that “[t]he procedural injury implicit in
agency failure to prepare an EIS—the creation of a risk that serious environmental
impacts will be overlooked—is itself a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ to support standing,
provided this injury is alleged by a plaintiff having a sufficient geographical nexus to
the site of the challenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever
environmental consequences the project may have. This is a broad test, but because
the nature and scope of environmental consequences are often highly uncertain before
study we think it an appropriate test.” Id. at 671.
124. Id. at 673 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 817 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1973) (upholding district court’s finding that court-ordered supplementation of the
Bureau of Reclamation’s EIS for construction of the New Melones Dam across the
Stanislaus River in California satisfied NEPA)).
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must “determine whether the responsible agency has
‘reasonably concluded’ that the project will have no significant
adverse environmental consequences.” 125 If a lead agency fails
to address, or inadequately considers, “substantial questions”
regarding a project’s likelihood of causing environmental
harms, under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, the agency must
prepare an EIS. 126
In the Davis highway project, the proponents claimed that
the consideration of what development, if any, would result
from construction of the interchange was “secondary,” and
therefore
insufficient,
to
require
environmental
analysis. 127 The court rejected that argument, stating that
analysis of secondary effects, while difficult to prepare, is
necessary because the purpose of an EIS is to analyze and
evaluate all of a project’s environmental consequences. 128
Thus, because the City raised substantial questions regarding
the environmental consequences of the project, the agency
could not dismiss those questions without the analysis
contained in an EIS. 129
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply the City of Davis v.
Coleman rule. For example, in Foundation for North Amercian
Wild Sheep v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 130 a coalition of
environmentalists and hunters challenged the adequacy of an
EA prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture

125. Id. at 673 (quoting Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir.
1973) (in a review of a decision as to whether the General Services Administration had
to prepare an EIS on a building to house the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fifth
Circuit determined that “[s]ince [plaintiff] has raised substantial environmental issues
concerning the proposed recommended project here, the court should proceed to
examine and weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine
whether the agency reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no
effects which would significantly degrade our environmental quality.”)).
126. Id. at 673 (“[W]here substantial questions are raised as to whether a project
will have significant adverse impacts it is hardly reasonable for an agency to conclude,
prior to study, that an EIS is not required.”).
127. Id. at 676.
128. Id. at 677 (“If impact statements are to be useful, they must address the major
environmental problems likely to be created by a project.”).
129. Id. at 675–76 (“We think that this is precisely the kind of situation Congress
had in mind when it enacted NEPA: substantial questions have been raised about the
environmental consequences of federal action, and the responsible agencies should not
be allowed to proceed with the proposed action in ignorance of what those
consequences will be.”).
130. 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982).
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for the issuance of a special use permit, which would have
allowed a mining company to repair and use a road running
through calving grounds of desert bighorn sheep in a national
forest. 131 The agency concluded that no EIS was necessary
after considering the effects of the road on the sheep. 132 The
district court upheld the agency’s decision, but, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, ruling that the agency’s EA lacked necessary
analysis of the likely effects on the sheep, thus creating
substantial questions and requiring preparation of an EIS.133
A similar result occurred in Idaho Sporting Congress v.
Thomas, 134 where the Ninth Circuit decided that NEPA
required the Forest Service to produce an EIS prior to selling
timber in Targhee National Forest. 135 The court held that
environmentalists raised substantial questions about the effect
that the timber sales would have on water quality, reversing
the district court. 136 And in Blue Mountains Biodiversity
Project v. Blackwood, 137 the Ninth Circuit determined that
environmentalists successfully raised substantial questions
about the effect of proposed timber salvage sales in Umatilla
National Forest. 138 The court reversed the district court and
ruled that an EIS was necessary to evaluate both the
individual projects and their cumulative impacts.139
131. Id. at 1174–76.
132. Id. at 1176.
133. Id. at 1178–82 (determining that although faced with substantial questions
about the project’s effects, the Department of Agriculture either “ignored or, at best,
shunted [the questions] aside with mere conclusory statements” and that “[c]ertainly
substantial questions are raised whether the closure of Road 2N06 for three months
will serve to mitigate the potential harm to the sheep. Where such substantial
questions are raised, an EIS must be prepared”).
134. 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
135. Id. at 1154 (overruled on other grounds by The Lands Council v. McNair, 537
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008)).
136. Id. at 1151 (“In light of the failure to provide adequate data to the public, we
conclude that an EIS is necessary to explore the substantial questions in respect to
whether and what significant effects the sale may have.”).
137. 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998).
138. Id. at 1213–14.
139. Id. (“The EA’s cursory and inconsistent treatment of sedimentation issues,
alone, raises substantial questions about the project’s effects on the environment and
the unknown risks to the area’s renowned fish populations. We do not find adequate
support for the Forest Service’s decision in its argument that the 3,000 page
administrative record contains supporting data. The EA contains virtually no
references to any material in support of or in opposition to its conclusions. That is
where the Forest Service’s defense of its position must be found.”).
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B.

Highly Uncertain Effects and the “Significance” Threshold

Sometimes the uncertainty of the effects of a federal
proposal can produce environmentally significant effects
within the meaning of NEPA. For example, in Anderson v.
Evans, 140 animal conservationists challenged an EA on an
agreement between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the Makah Tribal Council to allow
the Tribe to hunt grey whales in Washington, arguing that the
FONSI issued by NOAA failed to consider the effects of the
hunt on the local whale population. 141 The district court ruled
for NOAA, deciding that the agency satisfied NEPA by taking
a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of allowing
the hunt. 142
The conservationists appealed, pointing to several of the
factors that the CEQ regulations defined as indicating action
“significantly” affecting the human environment, and therefore
triggering preparation of an EIS. 143 One of these factors is
“[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the human
environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or
unknown risks.” 144 The Ninth Circuit concluded that that “if
there are substantial questions about the impact on the
number of whales who frequent the Strait of Juan de Fuca and
the northern Washington Coast, an EIS must be prepared.” 145
Consequently, the court held that the EA’s analysis failed to
adequately consider the effect that whaling would have on the
local whale population. 146 Because the conservationists raised
substantial questions—which the EA failed to properly
analyze—they satisfied the CEQ standard for “significance” in
federal actions, and the Ninth Circuit proceeded to conclude

140. 371 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2002).
141. Id. at 484–86; the conservationists also claimed violation of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).
142. Id. at 486.
143. Id. at 488; the CEQ factors are found at 40 C.F.R § 1508.27 (2012).
144. 40 C.F.R § 1508.27(b)(5) (2012).
145. 371 F.3d at 490.
146. Id. at 492. The court stressed that despite the extensive analysis in the EA on
the effect on the overall grey whale population, “[n]o one, including the government’s
retained scientists, has a firm idea what will happen to the local whale population if
the Tribe is allowed to hunt and kill whales pursuant to the approved quota and
Makah Management Plan.” Id. at 490.
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that the FONSI issued by NOAA on the proposed whaling did
not satisfy NEPA procedures. 147
C.

The Effect of the “Substantial Questions” Test: Forcing
Agencies to Conduct More Rigorous Environmental
Analysis

The Ninth Circuit’s threshold rule—that a plaintiff need
only raise substantial questions about the effect of a proposed
action to succeed on a claim that an action requires an EIS—
favors NEPA plaintiffs and seems firmly established. 148 A
number of courts outside the Ninth Circuit have turned to the
“substantial questions” test when confronted with challenges
to an agency’s decision to issue a FONSI. 149 For example, in
147. Id. at 494.
148. See, e.g., Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 865 (9th
Cir. 2005) (substantial question as to whether construction of a dock extension would
cause significant environmental degradation required an EIS); Makua v. Rumsfeld,
163 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1222 (D. Haw. 2001) (finding that substantial questions existed
about environmental effects of naval training at military reservation); Blue Mountains
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)
(environmentalists raised substantial questions about the environmental impacts of
timber salvage sales, requiring an EIS); Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d
1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) (substantial questions about the environmental impacts of
timber sales required an EIS); Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
681 F.2d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1982) (substantial questions about effects of road
construction on protected big horn sheep in a national forest required an EIS);
However, not all questions raised by plaintiffs satisfy this standard, see Bering Strait
Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d 938, 957
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “concerns about air quality, biological resources, and
water quality” were adequately addressed in the EA prepared for a mining project);
Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Simply because a challenger can cherry pick information and data out of the
administrative record to support its position does not mean that a project is highly
controversial or highly uncertain.”).
149. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 18 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] party
challenging the agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS must show only that there is a
substantial possibility that the action may have a significant impact on the
environment, not that it clearly will have such an impact . . . . The Forest Service’s
determination that preparation of an EIS was not necessary, based on the record
before it, was therefore arbitrary and capricious.” (citing Found. for N. Am. Wild
Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1177-78; Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 467)); Weiss v.
Kempthorne, 683 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (“Plaintiffs indicate that
their burden is to raise ‘substantial questions’ as to whether a project ‘may have a
significant effect . . . . But Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard because their contention
that the use of the contaminated mitigation parcels may have significant impacts that
were not considered by the agencies is merely unsupported speculation. Such
speculation is insufficient to raise a ‘substantial’ question.” (citing Anglers of the Au
Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F. Supp. 2d 812, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (ruling that
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Fund for Animals v. Norton, 150 the District of Columbia
District Court ruled that FWS violated NEPA when the agency
issued a FONSI while granting the state of Maryland a
depredation permit under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to kill
up to 1500 mute swans. A group of animal protection
organizations and individuals challenged the permit, and the
court found substantial questions regarding the environmental
effects of the depredation. 151
Once a NEPA plaintiff has raised substantial questions
about the potential environmental effects of an action for
which an agency issued a FONSI, the burden shifts to that
agency to show that there will be no significant impact on the
environment. 152 This rule causes more analysis to be
produced—either to show that no EIS is required or to produce
an EIS—giving both agencies and the public more information
about potential environmental effects before decisions are
made. The result is that the scenario envisioned by NEPA’s
BLM and the Forest Service impermissibly narrowed the range of alternatives for an
EIS on exploratory oil and gas drilling)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, No. 10-1313,
2012 WL 204494 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012); Choate v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.
4:07-CV-01170-WRW, 2008 WL 4833113 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 5, 2008) (“‘If substantial
questions are raised regarding whether the proposed action may have a significant
effect upon the human environment, a decision not to prepare an EIS is unreasonable.’
Said another way: when the environmental effects of a proposed action are highly
uncertain or involve unique or unknown risk, an agency must prepare an EIS.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717 (9th
Cir. 1988)); Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 553 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“[B]ased
on the number of ‘intensity’ factors implicated by the Mortality II [timber harvest]
Project, as well as the magnitude of the project, plaintiffs have raised ‘substantial
questions’ regarding the issue of whether the Mortality II Project ‘may’ have a
significant effect on the human environment . . . Therefore, the failure of the Forest
Service to prepare an EIS for the Mortality II Project violated its NEPA obligations,
and the decision of the Forest Service to approve the project was arbitrary and
capricious.” (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 917 F. Supp. 280 (D. Vt. 1995)
(holding that proposals to extend road and conduct logging operations were
“significant”))).
150. 281 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2003).
151. Id. at 234 (“[FWS] failed to identify the precise locations at which mute swans
will be killed, the number of birds that will be killed at particular individual sites, or
the environmental impacts of those killings on local communities.”).
152. When a plaintiff alleges that a proposed project will significantly affect the
human environment, it does not require courts to “determine whether a challenged
project will in fact have significant effects. Rather, we are to determine whether the
responsible agency has ‘reasonably concluded’ that the project will have no significant
adverse environmental consequences.” City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 673
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir.
1973)).
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drafters is more likely to occur: given more information,
agencies will make better decisions, producing better
environmental outcomes.
V.

REDUCING THE RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES FOR
CONSERVATION ACTIONS

Alternatives analysis is the “heart” of an EIS. 153 The
“purpose and need statement,” a required element of each EIS,
determines the required range of alternatives. 154 Courts give
agencies wide discretion to define a project’s purpose and
need. 155 A narrow statement of purpose and need allows an
agency to consider only the alternatives that would accomplish
that purpose and need, 156 along with the required “no action

153. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012) (CEQ NEPA regulations) (“[Alternatives
analysis] is the heart of the environmental impact statement. Based on the
information and analysis presented in the sections on the Affected Environment (§
1502.15) and the Environmental Consequences (§ 1502.16), it should present the
environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus
sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the
decisionmaker and the public.”).
154. “The statement shall briefly specify the underlying purpose and need to which
the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including the proposed action.”
40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 (2012); see City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123
F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that NEPA analysis of highway realignment
project, including the alternatives analysis, was adequate, and explaining that “[t]he
stated goal of a project necessarily dictates the range of ‘reasonable’ alternatives and
an agency cannot define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms.” See also Nat’l
Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir.
2010) (“The BLM may not circumvent this proscription by adopting private interests to
draft a narrow purpose and need statement that excludes alternatives that fail to meet
specific private objectives, yet that was the result of the process here. The BLM
adopted Kaiser’s interests as its own to craft a purpose and need statement so
narrowly drawn as to foreordain approval of the land exchange.”), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1783 (U.S. 2011); Haws, supra note 2 (discussing how courts assess the adequacy of
a purpose and need statement).
155. Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998)
(ruling that the purpose and need statement in an EIS on a proposed timber sale in a
national forest was not unreasonably narrow; “[t]he preparation of [an EIS]
necessarily calls for judgment, and that judgment is the agency’s. But the courts can,
and should, require full, fair, bona fide compliance with NEPA” (quoting Lathan v.
Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (requiring that NEPA documents be made
available prior to public hearings))).
156. City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an
EIS on the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to approve a permit for construction and
operation of a log transfer facility on land owned by native shareholders in Alaska
contained adequate alternatives analysis, noting that “[w]hen the purpose is to
accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which
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alternative.” 157 However, an agency may not define a project’s
objectives too narrowly. 158 The Ninth Circuit applies a “rule of
reason” to both an EIS’s statement of purpose and its range of
alternatives. 159 The Ninth Circuit articulated this standard in

another thing might be achieved”).
157. The CEQ regulations require an EIS to “[i]nclude the alternative of no action.”
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012).
158. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1155; see also Simmons v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Army Corps of
Engineers relied on a too-narrow purpose and need statement by limiting the proposed
project to ease water shortages to two water districts to a single facility); Citizens
Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ruling that the
Federal Aviation Administration’s EIS on a decision to approve an airport expansion
in Toledo contained adequate alternatives analysis but noting that “[a]n agency may
not define the objectives of its action in terms so unreasonably narrow that only one
alternative from among the environmentally benign ones in the agency’s power would
accomplish the goals of the agency’s action, and the EIS would become a foreordained
formality”).
159. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058,
1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We evaluate an agency’s statement of purpose under a
reasonableness standard.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (U.S. 2011); California v.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Judicial review of the range of alternatives
considered by an agency is governed by a ‘rule of reason’ that requires an agency to set
forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a ‘reasoned choice.’” (citing Save Lake
Wash. v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (ruling that supplemental EIS for
construction of docking facilities for NOAA vessels in Lake Washington adequately
considered “navigational risks,” opposing viewpoints, and the location selected for the
docks))); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973) (declaring that
EIS for construction of a new runway at Honolulu airport adequately considered a
reasonable range of alternatives). This “rule of reason” standard is also followed in the
First Circuit, Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684
F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[T]he guideline adopted by EPA to limit its study of
alternatives appears, in this case, to be consistent with the ‘rule of reason’ by which a
court measures federal agency compliance with NEPA’s procedural requirements.”);
the Second Circuit, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2d
Cir. 1975) (“[W]e agree with the district court that the discussion of alternatives in an
EIS is governed by a ‘rule of reason.’”); the Fifth Circuit, Miss. River Basin Alliance v.
Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000) (“This Court is to follow the ‘rule of
reason’ . . . . Agencies must explore and evaluate all reasonable alternatives.”); the
Sixth Circuit, Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Kempthorne, 453 F.3d 334, 346
(6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he agency may apply a ‘rule of reason’ in this area and discuss only
‘reasonable’ alternatives to the proposed action”); the Eighth Circuit, Friends of
Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1128 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We
review the agency’s choice of which alternatives to discuss and the extent to which the
EIS must discuss them under the ‘rule of reason.’”); the Tenth Circuit, Colo. Envtl.
Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that alternatives
analysis in an EIS on the potential expansion of a ski area in a national forest satisfied
the “rule of reason”); Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297
F.3d 1012, 1031 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Forest Service did not breach the ‘rule of
reason’ by refusing to study in detail alternatives that would have limited the
[proposed ski resort’s] structure’s size to between 1,600 square feet and 22,000 square
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1982 in California v. Block, which ruled that the U.S. Forest
Service’s EIS on its second roadless area review and evaluation
(RARE II) program failed to consider an adequate range of
alternatives. 160
In the RARE II EIS the Forest Service analyzed eleven
alternatives, three “points of reference” and eight “seriously
considered” alternatives, that each envisioned opening at least
thirty-seven percent of roadless areas to development. 161 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the Forest Service failed to
adequately consider a reasonable range of alternatives striking
a balance between development and preserving potential
wilderness areas because it did not consider any alternative
restricting development to a smaller percentage of the roadless
area. 162 The court stated that the absence of any alternatives
that included development on less than one-third of the RARE
areas was both “puzzling” and “troubling.”163 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the
Forest Service’s alternatives analysis in the RARE II EIS
violated NEPA. 164
Twenty years later, roadless area management again
provided the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to address the
standard for a reasonable range of alternatives. This time, the

feet or moved the structure off-peak altogether.”); the D.C. Circuit, Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e review both an
agency’s definition of its objectives and its selection of alternatives under the ‘rule of
reason.’”); and has support from the Supreme Court’s statement that “inherent in
NEPA and its implementing regulations is a ‘rule of reason,’ which ensures that
agencies determine whether and to what extent to prepare an EIS based on the
usefulness of any new potential information to the decisionmaking process.” Dep’t of
Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).
160. 690 F.2d at 768.
161. Id. at 765. “The Final EIS lists eleven alternatives, of which three—“all
Wilderness,” “no Wilderness” and “no action”—were included as points of reference
rather than as seriously considered alternatives . . . All eight of the alternatives
seriously considered by the Forest Service assume that at least thirty-seven percent of
the RARE II areas should be developed . . . No justification is given for this
fundamental premise or the trade-off it reflects.” Id. at 767.
162. Id. (“Although the RARE II Final EIS poses the question whether development
should occur at all, it uncritically assumes that a substantial portion of the RARE II
areas should be developed and considers only those alternatives with that end
result.”).
163. Id. at 768.
164. Id. at 769 (“[W]e conclude it was unreasonable for the Forest Service to
overlook the obvious alternative of allocating more than a third of the RARE II acreage
to a Wilderness designation.”).
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lawsuit concerned the Forest Service’s “roadless rule”
promulgated late in the Clinton Administration, 165 and the
Ninth Circuit relaxed the scope of required alternatives when
an agency proposes a conservation action, such as protecting
roadless areas of national forests. 166
A.

Requiring Analysis of All Viable Alternatives

In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 167 the tribe—joined
by timber companies, two counties, recreation groups, and
livestock owners—challenged the “roadless rule” 168 proposed
by the Forest Service. 169 Several environmental groups
intervened as defendants. The tribe alleged that the Forest
Service violated NEPA because its EIS did not consider a
sufficient range of alternatives. 170 Relying on the Ninth
Circuit’s rule that an EIS lacking analysis of a “viable”
alternative violates NEPA, 171 the district court reiterated that
NEPA requires a thorough alternatives analysis for any
proposed resource use. 172

165. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless
Area Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143
(2004); Martin Nie, Administrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest
Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RES. J. 687 (2004).
166. Id.
167. 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Idaho 2001).
168. The roadless rule “generally ban[s] road building subject to limited exceptions
including the preservation of ‘reserved or outstanding rights’ or discretionary Forest
Service construction necessary for public health and safety.” Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v.
Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting then 36 C.F.R. §
294.12(b)(1),(3)).
169. Kootenai Tribe, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1235–36.
170. Id. at 1243.
171. Id. (“[T]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an
environmental impact statement inadequate.”) (quoting Citizens for a Better
Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling that the EIS for
construction of transmission line across federal property within a city’s limits was
adequate)).
172. The court first acknowledged that the standard for determining whether the
agency failed to consider a viable alternative was unclear. Id. (“[T]he practicalities of
the requirement of are difficult to define.”); then the court emphasized the importance
of thorough alternatives analysis. Id. (“NEPA requires all agencies of the Federal
Government, to the fullest extent possible, to ‘[s]tudy, develop, and describe
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which
involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.’”); and
concluded by analyzing the standard for determining if an EIS has satisfied the
requirement to consider a reasonable range of alternatives is to consider: “(1) whether
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The Forest Service’s EIS considered just three alternatives,
each of which prohibited all road construction in roadless areas
differing in terms of restrictions imposed on timber
harvesting. 173 Because the district court saw no basis in the
record for the limited range of alternatives the Forest Service
evaluated, it ruled that the EIS’s range of alternatives was
inadequate. 174 Thus, according to the district court, the Forest
Service violated NEPA by failing to consider viable
alternatives that would have allowed some level of road
construction, while preserving other roadless areas.175
B.

Reducing the Range of Alternatives for Conservation
Actions

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, 176 ruling that
when an agency undertakes an action aimed at producing
environmental protection, an EIS’s range of alternatives need
not be as extensive as would be required for an
environmentally destructive project. 177 The court thus reached

the federal agency has sufficiently detailed information to make its decision in light of
potential environmental consequences, and (2) whether the federal agency has
provided the public with information on the environmental impact of the proposed
action and encouraged public participation in the development of that information.” Id.
173. The EIS also included a “no action alternative,” which “was included as a
required point of reference rather than a seriously considered alternative.” Id.
174. Id. at 1243–44.
175. The court noted that “an agency need not evaluate alternatives that are
inconsistent with policy objectives” but determined that there were available
alternatives to consider that would fulfill the rule’s stated purpose, which was “to
prohibit activities that pose the greatest risk to the social and ecological values of
inventoried roadless areas.” Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401,
1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the alternatives analysis in an EIS prepared by the
Forest Service prior to approving a forest management plan for an area including
spotted owl habitat)).
176. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated
by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (eliminating the
Ninth Circuit’s “federal defendant rule” that “categorically prohibit[ed] private parties
and state and local governments from intervening of right on the merits of claims
brought under [NEPA],” and abrogating previous rulings upholding the rule. 630 F. 3d
at 1176, 1180–81).
177. “The NEPA alternatives requirement must be interpreted less stringently
when the proposed agency action has a primary and central purpose to conserve and
protect the natural environment, rather than to harm it.” Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at
1120; The court added that “[c]ertainly, it was not the original purpose of Congress in
NEPA that government agencies in advancing conservation of the environment must
consider alternatives less restrictive of developmental interests.” Id.
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a conclusion similar to Douglas County: NEPA requires less
analysis for conservation actions. 178
The Kootenai Tribe court acknowledged that the roadless
rule EIS lacked alternatives allowing road building. 179
However, alternatives allowing road construction as a part of a
“roadless rule” were entirely contrary to the action’s purpose of
protecting the roadless areas. 180 As a result, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Forest Service’s EIS as complying with NEPA
because it concluded that the Forest Service’s stated objective
of protecting roadless areas in national forests from
environmental damage was a reasonable one. 181
The court decided that NEPA does not require the Forest
Service to analyze environmentally destructive alternatives
when planning a conservation action because NEPA’s purpose
is not served by delaying environmentally protective actions or
requiring lengthy analysis of alternative actions that are
inconsistent
with
the
Agency’s
conservation
goals. 182 Consequently, the district court erred because the
Forest Service properly limited the range of alternatives in its
EIS to those that would advance the Agency’s protection of the

178. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), discussed supra notes
96–108 and accompanying text.
179. Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1120.
180. Id. at 1120–21. The Ninth Circuit emphasized the many benefits of the
roadless rule, including the fact that “unspoiled forest provides not only sheltering
shade for the visitor and sustenance for its diverse wildlife but also pure water and
fresh oxygen for humankind.” Id. at 1121. The roadless rule EIS stated that the
“purpose and need” of the rule was “1) to immediately stop activities that have the
greatest likelihood of degrading desirable characteristics of inventoried roadless areas,
2) to ensure that ecological and social characteristics of inventoried roadless and other
unroaded areas are identified and considered through local forest planning efforts, and
3) to consider the unique social and economic situation of the Tongass National
Forest.” U.S. FOREST SERVICE, ROADLESS AREA CONSERVATION DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SUMMARY AND PROPOSED RULES 4–5 (May 2000),
available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5139061.pdf.
181. 313 F.3d at 1122 (“Protecting the roadless areas of our national forests from
further degradation can hardly be termed unreasonably narrow.”) (referring to City of
Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997)
(ruling that NEPA analysis of highway realignment project, including the alternatives
analysis, was adequate)).
182. Id. at 1122–23 (“[I]t would turn NEPA on its head to interpret the statute to
require that the Forest Service conduct in-depth analyses of environmentally
damaging alternatives that are inconsistent with the Forest Service’s conservation
policy objectives.”).
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roadless areas. 183
C.

The Effect of Reducing the Range of Alternatives for
Conservation Actions

Kootenai Tribe’s ruling relaxing alternatives analysis review
for conservation actions has yet to receive much attention from
other courts. 184 However, the Tenth Circuit recently upheld the
roadless rule as complying with NEPA, marking the possible
end of the tortuous litigation on that subject.
In 2003, the District of Wyoming ruled that the roadless rule
EIS violated NEPA by including inadequate alternatives
analysis. 185 The Tenth Circuit reversed, deciding that the
district court’s decision was moot after the Bush
Administration adopted a different roadless rule, known as the
“state petitions rule.” 186 Then, the Northern District of
183. Id. Judge Kleinfeld wrote a partial dissent, opining that by failing to analyze
an alternative that did not ban all road construction, the Forest Service failed to take
the required “hard look” at the effects of the roadless rule. Id. at 1126–31 (Kleinfeld,
J., dissenting). He then repeated that “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined
alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate.” Id. at 1129
(quoting Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. 1994) (ruling that
the Forest Service’s Flathead National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan
and the forest-wide EIS violated the ESA by causing jeopardy for threatened grizzly
bears, but holding that the EIS, including the alternatives analysis, satisfied NEPA)).
Kleinfeld’s conclusions conflicted with the majority’s view that NEPA did not require
consideration of environmentally harmful alternatives that were beyond the proposed
action’s purpose and need, as stated in the EIS. Id. at 1126–31.
184. Kootenai Tribe’s ruling has generated two positive citations in the Ninth
Circuit. See Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 871 (9th Cir.
2004) (ruling that an EIS on managing flows in the Trinity River included a
reasonable range of alternatives); Pac. Coast Fed’n Of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Locke, No.
C 10–04790 CRB, 2011 WL 3443533, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (holding that an
EIS on establishing a limited access fishing program in the Pacific coast groundfish
fishery included a reasonable range of alternatives). Additionally, the District of
Wyoming gave it passing reference when ruling that the roadless rule EIS had
inadequate alternatives analysis. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Wyoming I), 277 F.
Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 (D. Wyo. 2003).
185. 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (“[T]he Forest Service did not give each reasonable
alternative substantial treatment in the EIS or take a hard look at the environmental
consequences of its actions.”).
186. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir.
2005). The state petitions rule “eliminated the uniform national protections of roadless
areas from road construction and reconstruction and timber harvesting, reverting to
the prior regime of forest-by-forest plans, but adding an optional state-by-state
petitioning process to alter the level of protection of roadless areas within individual
state borders from that afforded by the forest plans. If a state’s petition were accepted,
rulemaking on management of roadless areas within that state would begin, although
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California enjoined the Bush state petitions rule, reinstating
the 2001 Clinton roadless rule. 187 The state of Wyoming
challenged the reinstated Clinton rule on the same grounds it
was attacked in the Ninth Circuit—for failing to consider a
reasonable range of alternatives—and the district court
enjoined the rule in Wyoming v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture. 188 But the Tenth Circuit reversed, deciding that
the Forest Service permissibly narrowed the range of
alternatives in the EIS’s purpose and need statement. 189 The
court decided that the Forest Service reasonably concluded
that road construction and harvesting timber were the
activities most harmful to roadless areas, and therefore the
agency could limit the range of alternatives considered to
restrictions on those activities. 190 Having properly limited the
purpose and need of the proposed action, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the range of alternatives analyzed by the
Forest Service’s EIS was reasonable. 191
The Tenth Circuit thus agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
the range of alternatives was not too narrow, although its
rationale for the relaxed range of alternatives was not
expressly because the roadless was an environmentally
protective action. 192 Thus, it is not entirely clear if the Tenth
individual forest plans would guide forest management starting immediately upon the
rule’s promulgation until changed in a state by rulemaking. For those states which did
not petition, forest plans would continue to govern roadless areas.” California ex rel.
Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
187. The Forest Service promulgated the state petitions rule without any NEPA
analysis or consultation under the ESA. Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 893–919. The
district court ruled that the Forest Service had violated both Acts, the court then
enjoined the state petitions rule and reinstated the roadless rule. Id.
188. Wyoming I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1339–40 (“[T]he Forest Service’s preordained
conception of what a roadless area would be, and its schedule for implementing the
final rule, caused the Forest Service to drive the Roadless Rule through the
administrative process without weighing the pros and cons of reasonable alternatives
to the Roadless Rule.”).
189. Wyoming II, 661 F.3d at 1250.
190. Id. at 1245–46 (“[T]he Forest Service’s decision to limit the alternatives
considered . . . was reasonable in light of its conclusion, based on ample evidence
presented in the EIS, that [road construction and timber harvest] posed the greatest
risk of destroying the characteristics of [roadless areas], which the proposed rule was
intended to protect and preserve.”).
191. Id. at 1250.
192. Id. at 1245–46 (“[A]ny alternative permitting road construction to a greater
extent would not further the defined objective of the Roadless Rule and would
therefore not be ‘reasonable.’”).
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Circuit will approve a reduced range of alternatives in other
EISs on conservation actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress passed NEPA intending it to provide significant
and unprecedented protection for the environment. 193 NEPA
calls on federal agencies to make special efforts to ensure that
“man and nature can exist in productive harmony.” 194 To
accomplish this goal, the statute established detailed
procedures for agencies to demonstrate detailed consideration
of the environmental consequences of their actions and to
publicly disclose those effects. The Ninth Circuit has fostered
NEPA’s environmental purpose by distinguishing conservation
measures from other federal proposals and subjecting actions
protecting the environment to a different standard than
actions likely to harm the environment. This interpretation is
consistent with CEQ’s instruction that NEPA’s purpose is to
help officials reach informed decisions that protect the
environment. 195
The four rules discussed in this paper concern different
points in the NEPA process. The first involves who has
standing to bring court challenges; the second pertains to
actions that trigger NEPA analysis; the third concerns when
an EIS is required; the fourth concerns the sufficiency of
alternatives analysis in an EIS when the proposal aims to
protect the environment.
The common thread among these rules is the Ninth Circuit’s
willingness to put the policy of NEPA to “create and maintain
193. See 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson)
(“[I]t is my view that [NEPA] is the most important and far-reaching environmental
and conservation measure ever passed by the Congress”); 115 CONG. REC. 40,926
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep. Saylor) (“[T]he importance of this
legislation cannot be overstated”); id. at 40,925–26 (statement of Rep. Garmatz)
(“[T]he ugly and devastating disease of pollution has contaminated every aspect of our
environment—air, land, and water. The problem is so vast and interrelated, one
segment of the environment cannot be separated from another. The only logical and
practical approach is a broad-ranging, coordinated Federal program, as is proposed in
this legislation.”).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006).
195. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2012) (“The NEPA process is intended to help public
officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.
These regulations provide the direction to achieve this purpose.”).
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conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony” into practice. 196 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretations
discussed in this paper all flow from that court’s refusal to lose
sight of Congress’s fundamental environmental purpose in
enacting NEPA. 197 If the Ninth Circuit’s interpretations were
more widely adopted by other circuits, both NEPA’s purpose
and its procedures would be better served.

196. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).
197. See supra notes 28–30, 33, 88 and accompanying text.
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